We examine the payout policy of U.S. firms over the period 1980-2008. Prior research indicates that firm characteristics, managerial preferences, and investor clienteles are all important factors in setting payout policy. Counter to the oft-reported positive relation between senior citizens and the use of dividends, we find no such significant relation. Our results indicate that either senior citizens are indifferent between dividends and repurchases, or that if seniors do demand dividends, they have no influence over firm payout policy. The evolution of firm characteristics, including the average firm size, age, and volatility of earnings over time, best explains payout policy.
Introduction
We examine possible drivers of firm payout policy including senior citizen clientele and firm characteristics. Evolving firm characteristics, such as firms becoming younger and smaller on average, over time, have been cited as one explanation for the diminishing propensity to pay dividends (Fama and French, 2001; Skinner, 2008) . Both age and tax-based clientele theories (Miller and Modigliani, 1961; Shefrin and Thaler, 1988; Scholz, 1992) indicate that certain investors, particularly seniors, may demand dividends. We examine these non-exhaustive and non-mutually exclusive potential drivers in order to gain a better understanding of the determinants of payout policy.
Senior investors are commonly believed to prefer dividends to repurchases or capital gains.
1 This fact, combined with the observation that individual investors prefer local stocks (Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2005) , suggests that firms headquartered in counties with a high proportion of dividends may cater to seniors. This hypothesis is tested using cross-sectional data by Becker et al. (2011) . However, over the last 30 years, the proportion of seniors (defined as the number of individuals over the age of 65, divided by the total population) has increased while the relative use of dividends has declined. Therefore, the time-series relation between seniors and payout policy is unclear a priori. We utilize the full panel of data over this period to analyze both cross-sectional and time-series implications.
One possibility is that seniors demand dividends and thereby influence firm payout policy. Becker et al. (2011) find empirical evidence of this in cross-sectional tests, and we confirm these cross-sectional results. They note several possible explanations for these findings.
The demand for dividends may be for consumption purposes (Miller and Modigliani, 1961; Shefrin and Thaler, 1988) , self-control (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981) , mental accounting (Shefrin and Statman, 1984) , or tax motives (Scholz, 1992) . The tax argument notes that seniors may have lower dividend tax rates than younger investors. However, as we consider in detail, dividends have historically been taxed at a higher rate than capital gains. As such, the tax motives may not provide a clear prediction. Regardless of the cause, in such a scenario firms may respond to current shareholder demands, and when there is a large presence of seniors, firms may increase dividends. Thus, we might expect to find a positive relation between the propensity to pay dividends and the proportion of seniors if the relationship between dividend-demanding seniors and firm payout policy is dominant.
However, it is also possible that the proportion of seniors is unrelated to firm payout policy. It may be that seniors are indifferent between dividends and repurchases, or seniors may actually prefer repurchases to dividends. It is also possible that seniors may actually demand dividends but have these demands ignored. Under the indifference scenario, forces other than demographics drive payout policy, and seniors do not seek to interfere with these forces via payout demands. Miller and Modigliani (1961) show that payout policy is irrelevant under a range of assumptions, although dividends may appear to be related to firm value because of an information effect. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) show that payout policy is relevant to firm value when constraints from Miller and Modigliani (1961) are relaxed. However, since both dividends and repurchases are generally found to be positive signals, the choice between the two payout methods may be irrelevant. 2 We note that this explanation does not conflict with the fact that the use of dividends has decreased over time while the proportion of seniors in the U.S. has increased. It may be that forces other than demographics drive payout policy and that senior citizenship has increased and dividends have decreased over the same period merely by coincidence.
Another possibility is that, counter to the senior clientele theory and empirical evidence from Becker et al. (2011) , seniors may actually prefer repurchases to dividends when the timeseries evidence is considered. This may be related to the tax implications for clienteles noted by Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2008) . Specifically, the U.S. tax code has traditionally applied a higher tax rate to dividends relative to capital gains. Prior to 2003 tax law changes, the top tax rate for dividends was 38.6%, compared to 20% as the top capital gains rate. Under such conditions, seniors may prefer repurchases to dividends in order to time their earnings and to pay less tax. After 2003, when the highest tax rates for both dividends and long-term capital gains were lowered to 15%, seniors should have theoretically been indifferent between dividends and repurchases with respect to tax implications.
Both our cross-sectional and time-series analysis suggests that firm characteristics, and not the senior clientele, drive payout policy. We find that once a key firm characteristic, earnings growth volatility, is considered in cross-sectional tests, the significance of the relation between the proportion of seniors and payout policy is weakened or eliminated. This suggests that the inclusion of dynamic firm specific factors (i.e., earnings volatility) dominates the impact of any senior clientele. It is possible that seniors do in fact demand dividends, but firms do not cater to the preferences of the senior clientele. We examine both of these possibilities in our analysis.
Instead of the positive relation between the level of seniors and the use of dividends found in Becker et al. (2011) , we find the change in senior proportion in a county is unrelated to both dividends and repurchases, regardless of which measure of payout is examined. The use of change in the proportion of seniors is based on our analysis of the full time series of yearly population data from 1980-2008. Our analysis indicates that the proportion of seniors is increasing over time (i.e., non-stationary); thus, we take this into account in our analysis by using the econometrically preferable change in proportion of seniors in our testing. 3 Our results are not sensitive to the use of first-differenced proportion of seniors, however. Our conclusions are qualitatively identical when focusing on decade changes in the proportion of seniors, or even on levels when using methodology from Fama and French (2001) .
We attempt to determine if senior investors are indifferent regarding dividend policy or if their hypothesized demands for dividends are ignored. We do this by focusing on firm size.
Large firms, with more dispersed ownership on average, are less likely to respond to individual investor demand. We note that seniors' holdings represent a reasonably large proportion of all investments. 4 As such, firms that ignore their preferences may alienate senior investors and thus face negative value implications. 5 We test this possibility by examining the interaction between a dummy variable for small firms and the change in seniors in our regressions. Theoretically, smaller firms should be relatively more likely to cater to local senior dividend demand and we would expect to observe a positive coefficient on the interaction term. However, we find that the interaction is negatively related to whether a firm pays dividends and is unrelated to the proportion of payout in dividends in our regressions. This indicates that senior proportion increases, in areas with small firms, are linked to a lower propensity to pay dividends. Thus, it is less likely that firms ignore the dividend demand of seniors and more likely that seniors do not 3 Nonstationarity of regressors with a stationary dependent variable creates a bias against rejecting a false null hypothesis (e.g., Granger and Newbold, 1974; Baffes, 1997) . In this case, Granger and Newbold (1974) and others suggest the use of a first-differenced variable. As an alternative way to address this issue, Granger and Newbold (1974) also suggest that models should be built with both levels and changes. 4 Becker et al. (2011) estimate that seniors represent 5%-6% of total stock ownership. 5 Baker and Wurgler (2004) find that dividends are relevant to share prices during periods of high dividend demand by investors and Kulchania (2013) find that firms decide between dividends and repurchases based on investor clientele demand.
particularly demand dividends. This is consistent with Dong, Robinson, and Veld (2005) who survey Dutch investors and note that "the notion amongst executives that elderly people consume from their dividend receipts is not confirmed." We test the explanation that seniors demand repurchases, due to tax incentives, by including an interaction measure between a post-2003 taxreduction dummy and the senior proportion. We find that the senior proportion is not related to the use of dividends relative to repurchases prior to or after 2003. Becker et al. (2011) focus on census population data from the years of 1980, 1990, and 2000 and find that dividend demand by seniors is an important determinant of payout policy in the cross-section. Similarly, Graham and Kumar (2006) find trading patterns in retail investors consistent with age and tax clienteles. Dong, Robinson, and Veld (2005) find that seniors may view dividends positively given potential savings on transaction costs relative to capital gains.
We find that either correcting the cross-sectional regression approach to account for dynamic firm factors such as earnings growth volatility (while leaving the econometric approach unchanged), or focusing on the change in the proportion of seniors, yields an insignificant relation between seniors and the use of dividends. With respect to time-series implications of an age-based clientele, Becker et al. (2011) suggest a lack of a time-series relation due to the stability of the proportion of seniors over time but do not explicitly consider a time-series analysis such as that provided herein. 6 Fama and French (2001) find that dynamic firm characteristics best explain dynamic payout policy; thus, it is useful to see if this general finding holds when considering potentially powerful shifts in investor demographics.
6 From Becker et al. (2011) , "While the dividend-demand hypothesis has strong cross-sectional predictions (companies located in areas with a larger fraction of seniors are more likely to pay dividends), it is unlikely to have affected the aggregate time series of dividend payments." The authors perform an indirect analysis of the change in the proportion of seniors by examining firm headquarter changes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data and methodology used in this study. In section 3, we present the results of our empirical analysis. We conclude in section 4.
Data and methodology

Data
We collect accounting data, including data on dividends and repurchases, from
Compustat. Additionally, like Becker et al. (2011) , we utilize corporate headquarter data from
Compustat to denote firm location. This approach was first taken by Moskowitz (1999, 2001 ) and later by Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) .
Returns and ex-dividend dates are taken from CRSP. We consider two definitions of dividends: ordinary quarterly dividends (distribution code 1232) as well as all ordinary dividends, which, in addition to ordinary quarterly dividends, includes ordinary semiannual (code 1242) and ordinary annual (code 1252) issuances. While the results herein are based on ordinary quarterly dividends, the conclusions reached are identical for the wider specification of dividends. We collect price and shares outstanding data from CRSP, as well, in order to control for size in our regression analysis. Size for year t is calculated based on CRSP data in December of year t-1.
In order to determine the prevalence of seniors in a given county, data from the U.S.
Census is gathered and matched at the county level, based on the corporate headquarters information taken from Compustat. Becker et al. (2011) utilize data on seniors at the county level from the census years of 1980, 1990, and 2000 . We, however, take advantage of the full time series and utilize the full panel of population estimates for each year over the period from 1980-2008. 7 Senior citizens are those aged 65 or older. We track, over time, the proportion of citizens in a county that are senior citizens. Specifically, the variable Seniors is the proportion of seniors (the number of citizens over the age of 65 in a given county-year divided by the total number of citizens in the county-year). We utilize all the control variables of Becker et al. (2011) . The basis for inclusion of these variables comes from the literature on payout policy. Fama and French (2001) find that dividend payers are generally more profitable, larger and have fewer growth opportunities. We include Size, which is the natural log of firm market value, to proxy for size. Net Income, Cash,
Regression methodology
and Long-Term Debt are each scaled by total assets and are included to capture profitability, cash balance, and capital structure. These are found to be significant in determining payout policy in Michaely (2005, 2008) , and Fama and French (2002) . Q is approximated using the market-to-book ratio and captures the growth opportunities of the firm.
Volatility is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the prior two years. Return is the compound monthly stock return of the past two years and is included to control for the relative preference between dividends and repurchases in a firm (to the extent that the two are substitutes Blau and Fuller, 2008, Han and Qiu, 2007; Officer, 2011) . Thus, we include Earn. Growth Vol. which is the standard deviation of operating income growth over the previous five years (from year -4 to 0). 10 This variable is similar in spirit to Volatility, used in Becker et al. (2011) , except that Volatility focuses on an outcome of payout (i.e., returns) instead of a determinant of payout (i.e., the earnings process).
All variable names and detailed definitions can be found in Appendix A.
We concentrates on census years only. Thus, we offer both cross-sectional and time-series analysis.
Summary statistics, stationarity tests and correlation
Summary statistics of the variables used in our regressions are presented in Panel A of Table 1 . Although our sample period differs from Becker et al. (2011) , our sample statistics indicate that both our payout and senior variables are similar in value. We compare the average percent of firms paying dividends of 47% in Becker et al. (2011) to our sample, for which the average is 39.67%, and conclude the samples are similar despite different coverage with respect to the specific years included. We find that, consistent with Becker et al. (2011) , the average 9 See, for example, Lee (1996) , Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000), Guay and Harford (2000) , Lie (2000) , Kumar and Lee (2001) , Lee and Rui (2007) , and Lee and Suh (2011) . 10 Our results are robust to the use of Earnings Volatility which uses a similar definition of earnings volatility as Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) . We, however, focus on Earn. Growth Vol. based on the potential nonstationary nature of the earnings process.
proportion of seniors in a given county for our sample is around 12%. Our sample exhibits significant variation among counties in the proportion of seniors as the minimum proportion is 3% and the maximum is 33%. Additionally, we find that the median year-over-year change in seniors is around 0.10% with a minimum change of a nearly 14% reduction and maximum change of a nearly 22% increase. We winsorize year-over-year change in seniors at the 1 st and 99 th percentile in our regression analysis in order to mitigate the impact of outliers in our sample.
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[Insert Table 1 here]
The use of the estimates for all years (including non-census years) of the senior variable leads to an important difference in our approach from previous literature. It is desirable for both left-and right-hand side variables in a regression to be stationary. If a variable is found to be non-stationary through unit root tests, the change in the variable should be utilized. However, using the change in a variable that is already stationary creates its own problems (i.e., a potential over-differencing issue which could lead to less stable coefficient estimates). Thus, it is important to carefully identify the stationarity of each variable. We examine this issue using the panel stationarity tests of Hadri (2000) and Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) (IPS) . While the former tests a null hypothesis of all panels being stationary, the latter test assumes that all panels are non-stationary under the null. These statistics are chosen because they are designed for panels with a large number of observations but a relatively small number of periods.
The results of our panel stationarity tests are found in Panel B of Table 1 . We conduct the unit root test on firms that are present for the period from 1990 to 2008 in order to ensure a large 11 Our results are qualitatively identical when we do not control for outliers in our key variable and are available upon request.
enough sample, as well as a long enough time period to provide an adequate test of stationarity.
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We find that the null of all panels being stationary is rejected for Seniors as well as all control variables. This indicates that all variables considered are non-stationary. However, the Hadri (2000) test uses a null that ALL panels are stationary, which makes rejection of the null very likely with a large number of panels. This motivates our additional consideration of the IPS test, which uses a null of non-stationarity. This test only assumes non-stationarity in a large proportion of the panels, as opposed to ALL panels as in Hadri (2000) . We fail to reject the null of non-stationarity for Seniors and Size (Log of Market Value). For these variables, the test results suggest that it is more appropriate to use the change (i.e., first difference) of these variables. Thus, Seniors and Size (Log of Market Value) warrant the use of the change (i.e., first difference) in our regressions. We thus create Change in Seniors (Change in Size), which is the county proportion of seniors (market value) in year t, minus the county proportion of seniors (market value) in year t -1.
The correlations for the variables used in our regressions are found in Panel C of Table 1 .
We find a positive correlation between the Dividend Payer and both Seniors and Change in Seniors although the correlation is only 7% and 1%, respectively, for the range of the sample.
We note the negative correlation between Seniors and two explanatory variables, Earnings Volatility and Earn. Growth Vol. The negative correlation indicates that firms headquartered in counties with a higher proportion of seniors are more (less) likely to have stable (volatile)
earnings. As stable earnings are associated with a higher propensity to pay dividends, the above relation may indicate a non-clientele based explanation for the results in Becker et al. (2011) .
Our regressions include two size proxies. The log of the market value of the firm (Size) and the 12 Results are robust to examining firms that are present for the entire period from 1980 to 2008 as well as to focusing on each respective decade (i.e., 1980 to 1989, 1990 to1999, and 2000 to 2008) . log of total assets (Log of Assets) are both included as independent variables. Although these variables are positively correlated (24% in Panel C of Table 1 ) we include both in our analysis in order to be consistent with Becker et al. (2011) .
Results
Cross-sectional regressions
The results of Becker et al. (2011) are based on cross-sectional tests which include payout-related measures as dependent variables and the proportion of seniors (firm characteristics) as the variable of interest (controls). Firm-specific controls are certainly appropriate given that the literature finds a strong link between certain firm characteristics and payout policy. For instance, smaller firms are, on average, less likely to pay dividends. We would also expect younger firms to be less likely to pay dividends. Indeed, Becker et al. (2011) control for these variables through the inclusion of log of market value, log of assets, and age indicators. Their controls do not, however, include proxies for the volatility of firm earnings.
Firms with more volatile earnings are expected to be less (more) likely to use dividends (repurchases).
In Table 2 we replicate the cross-sectional regressions of Becker et al. (2011) except that we consider earnings growth volatility (instead of return volatility) controls in the specifications. In order to confirm that our sample is consistent with census data used in Becker et al.
(2011), we replicate their cross-sectional regressions focusing on the census years of 1980, 1990, and 2000 , using only the controls of that paper, in Appendix B. These results are consistent with Becker et al. (2011) . Specifically, in Appendix B, we find that Seniors is positively related to the propensity to pay dividends, the propensity to initiate dividends, and dividend yields (all significant at the 1% level). Thus, it does not appear that our results are driven by the use of a different measure of seniors than Becker et al. (2011) or other data concerns.
While Seniors remains significantly related to Dividend Yield in Table 2 , the economic significance of the result is nearly halved. In Appendix B, the results indicate that when using the Becker et al. (2011) controls only, a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of seniors is associated with a 0.12% increase in Dividend Yield. In Table 2 , our results suggest that the inclusion of additional controls reduces the increase in Dividend Yield associated with a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of seniors to 0.07%. Further, a one standard deviation increase in the new variable, Earn. Growth Vol., is associated with a reduction in the probability of a firm paying dividends of 10.02%. While the proportion of seniors is not statistically significant in Table 2 , we compare these results to the economic significance tabulated based on Appendix B. The results in Appendix B suggest that a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of seniors is associated with a 1.92% increase in the probability of a firm paying dividends. Overall, the results suggest that firm characteristics primarily drive firm payout decisions. Figure 1a shows the time series of the average proportion of seniors in the U.S., the average firm's propensity to pay dividends, and the proportion of total payout issued in the form of repurchases. While the proportion of seniors has steadily increased over the 1980-2008 period (see Figure 1b for closer examination on seniors), the propensity to pay dividends has declined and the proportion of payout in the form of repurchases has increased. At first inspection, this figure is not consistent with seniors demanding dividends. We note that the pattern observed over time for earnings volatility (not included in Figure 1a ) closely matches the pattern for the relative use of repurchases. Thus, the figures are consistent with either senior preference for repurchases, or senior indifference to payout policy combined with other non-demographic factors (i.e., increased volatility of earnings), or senior demand for dividends but a lack of influence over payout policy. We provide more rigorous tests of the relation below.
Changes in seniors
[Insert Figures 1a and 1b here]
In Table 3 , we use county-level sorts based on the change in proportion of seniors over the time period examined. This provides a longer horizon view of the role that changing demographics plays in payout policy. In our analysis, we require counties to have at least 3 incorporated firms in order to be included in the sample. This is done in order to make county comparisons more balanced in terms of number of firms.
14 We sort our sample into quintiles such that quintile 1 (5) contains the counties with the smallest (largest) influx of seniors.
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Within each quintile, firms are aggregated so that county affiliation is no longer relevant.
Dividend Payer% is the percentage of firms that pay dividends. Dividend Proportion% is the percentage of distributions that are granted via dividends.
We implement the sort for each decade (i.e., 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2008) , separately. In Table 3 One possible explanation for this result is that firms in counties with an influx of seniors may exhibit characteristics consistent with non-dividend paying firms. This explanation is consistent with the observation from Table 3 that counties in quintile 5 are the smallest firms in terms of market capitalization for all three decades. We further examine the role of firm characteristics in subsequent tests.
[Insert Table 3 here] Table 4 provides a more rigorous framework to examine the relation observed in Figure 1 and 16 We note that Change in Seniors is negatively and significantly related to the use of dividends when we exclude the controls not included in Becker et al. (2011) . Results are not included for brevity but are available upon request. 17 The negative and significant relation for volatility is qualitatively identical regardless of the volatility proxy used and the overall conclusions of the table are also unchanged. Specifically, the results reported are robust to using either Volatility, Earnings Volatility, or Earn. Growth Vol. separately or together.
suggest that factors related to the evolution of firm characteristics are the major drivers of payout policy.
[Insert Table 4 here]
It is possible that, despite the observed insignificant relation between seniors and dividends found in Tables 2, 3 and 4, seniors do in fact demand dividends, but large firms ignore this preference. In Table 5 , we interact a dummy variable for small firm status (below median market capitalization) with our Change in Seniors variable. We maintain the same regression framework as previously undertaken and focus on the dependent variables Dividend Payer, Dividend Proportion, and Payout Ratio.
We find that the interaction between small firms and the change in seniors is not significantly related to payout, regardless of the dependent variable. Additionally, Change in Seniors is either not significantly related to payout (Dividend Payer and Payout Ratio) or is negative and significantly related to payout (Dividend Proportion).
[Insert Table 5 here]
Another possibility is that seniors actually demand repurchases. Seniors may prefer repurchases to dividends when capital gains are given preferential tax treatment relative to dividends. This describes the U.S. tax code prior to the 2003 tax code revisions. Thus, in Table 6 we include controls used in previous regressions and add a dummy variable for years [Insert Table 6 here] Table 7 follows the same approach as Table 4 with one important change. We focus on the decade-over-decade changes for census years only (i.e., 1990 over 1980 and 2000 over 1990, respectively) in Table 7 instead of the year-over-year changes from Table 4 . This approach has two notable benefits. First, while our previous year-over-year analysis is econometrically justifiable given the non-stationarity of seniors, the economic implications of single-year demographic changes on following-year firm decisions can be potentially problematic.
Specifically, our finding that change in seniors is unrelated to payout may be driven by the fact that firms do not respond as quickly to demographic changes as our earlier models would suggest. The model in Table 7 uses the change in seniors over the previous ten years, which should allow for firms to adequately adjust for demographic changes. Second, it may be argued that our reliance on census estimates yields results that are not directly comparable to Becker et al. (2011) . The analysis in Table 7 uses actual census year data only, which should alleviate concerns related to the use of estimates.
The results in Table 7 are consistent with our previous results. We find that in all specifications Change in Seniors is unrelated to payout. The results are inconsistent with firms responding to seniors demanding dividends, even over longer periods.
[Insert Table 7 here]
In order to ensure our results are not due to the choice of methodology, we consider an alternative approach utilized by Fama and French (2001) . They employ Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions with payout variables as the dependent variables and firm profitability, asset growth, market-to-book, and the NYSE size percentile for a firm in a given year as control variables. We use this approach for the dependent variables Dividend Payer, Dividend
Proportion, and Payout Ratio in Table 8 .
Our results are consistent with the earlier analysis. Specifically, change in seniors is negatively related to Dividend Payer (significant at the 5% level) and not related to either Payout Ratio or Dividend Proportion.
[Insert Table 8 here]
In Table 9 , we employ another method in the spirit of Fama and French (2001) . We estimate a logit model for the period 1980-1999 which attempts to explain why firms pay dividends. Specifically, Dividend Payer is the dependent variable and the controls are the same as those used in Table 2 . The coefficients estimated over the period 1980-1999 are then combined with the actual firm characteristics in the 2000-2008 period to generate the expected percent of firms that will pay dividends. The Fama and French (2001) comparison between the actual percent of dividend payers and the expected percent of payers is used to determine a declining propensity to pay. While this approach still applies to our analysis, we have an additional interest. Specifically, we are interested in the importance of the level of seniors in payout policy, relative to other firm characteristics. As such, we conduct the analysis both including and excluding the level of seniors. We can then compare the expected percent of dividend payers of the two models to examine the importance of seniors in determining payout policy.
This method provides another time-series analysis, in addition to the tests of change in seniors done previously. While the non-stationary nature of seniors indicates that firstdifferencing is desirable, it is possible that the seniors time series is characterized by a structural break which may be important to consider. Consistent with this, we find some evidence of a possible structural break around 1999 (see also Figures 1a and 1b) . This potential structural break motivates the use of the period 1980-1999 for our basis of logit regression. Thus, using the level of seniors (as opposed to changes in Table 8 ) provides another method which allows us to examine the role of seniors in determining payout policy.
In Table 9 , we find that both the expected and actual percent of dividend payers increase from 2000 to 2008. The actual percent of payers is less than the expected percent of payers in all years, which is consistent with a declining propensity to pay. Perhaps of more interest in our analysis is the comparison in the expected percent of payers between the model including seniors and the model excluding seniors. In all cases, we find that the expected percent of payers is very close in both models with an average difference of 1.47%. 18 This is consistent with our previous analysis which suggests that the proportion of seniors adds little to the explanation of firm payout policy. Moreover, the model including seniors actually predicts a lower expected percent of payers in all years. This is further evidence that an increase in seniors over time is not associated with a higher propensity to pay dividends. Finally, the unreported logit loadings reveal that Seniors is insignificantly related to Dividend Payer in the estimation period of 1980-1999. Results are robust to including variables from Table 8 and using the midpoint of our sample, 1995, as the cutoff period.
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[Insert Table 9 here]
Conclusion
In this paper, for the first time, we examine the relation between senior clienteles and firm payout policy using a full panel data set that exploits time-series patterns between seniors and payout policy. Instead of a positive relation between seniors and dividends, as found by other authors in the cross-section (which we confirm), we find an insignificant relation between the change in seniors and the propensity to pay dividends. Becker et al. (2011) document the existence of a cross-sectional senior dividend clientele effect in which individuals over the age of 65 prefer dividends to repurchases or capital gains. Once we control for an additional firm characteristic, the stability of earnings, the significance of the cross-sectional relation between senior proportion and dividend payout variables is reduced or eliminated.
These results are consistent with senior indifference to firm payout or with firms ignoring the demands of seniors. Instead of senior clientele demand determining payout policy, we find that firm characteristics drive payout policy. This conclusion is confirmed using the econometrically preferable change in seniors in our analysis. Tests in the spirit of Fama and French (2001) similarly indicate that the proportion of seniors is not related to payout in an economically meaningful way. Further, the results suggest a negative relation between an increase in seniors over time and firm propensity to pay dividends.
Our results are not sensitive to methodology and are not the result of an unusual sample.
We provide a comprehensive picture of the impact of seniors and changing firm dynamics on (6) 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.07 -0.14 1.00 Size (7) 0 Table 2 Cross-sectional regressions
Seniors is the proportion of seniors in a given county. Size is the natural log of market value. Earn. Growth Vol. is the standard deviation of operating income growth over the previous five years from year -4 to 0. Net Income, Cash, and Long-Term Debt are scaled by total assets. Q is approximated using the market-to-book ratio. Volatility is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the prior two years. Return is the monthly stock returns over the prior two years. Size is the natural log of firm market value. Log of Assets is the natural log of total assets. Asset Growth is the natural log of the growth rate of total assets over the prior year. Additionally, we include age-group indicator variables which are dummies for firms between 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, and 16-20 years old, as well as industryyear interaction dummy, and state-year interaction dummy variables. Robust standard errors which are clustered by firm are used in all regressions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Table 3 County sorts by change in seniors over each decade
We sort our sample so that counties with the smallest influxes of seniors (or a decline in seniors) over the decade examined are found in quintile 1, and counties with the largest increases in seniors are found in quintile 5. Within each quintile firms are aggregated so that county affiliation is no longer relevant. Within each quintile Firms is the number of firms in the quintile, Mean Size is the average market value for a firm in the quintile (in millions), Dividend Payer% is the percentage of firms that pay dividends, and Dividend Proportion% is the percentage of distributions that are granted via dividends. Table 4 Dividend payout and change in seniors
1980-1989
Change in Seniors is the year-over-year change in the proportion of seniors in a given county. Size is the natural log of market value. Earn. Growth Vol. is the standard deviation of operating income growth over the previous five years from year -4 to 0. Net Income, Cash, and Long-Term Debt are scaled by total assets. Q is approximated using the market-to-book ratio. Volatility is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the prior two years.
Return is the monthly stock returns over the prior two years. Change in Size is the year over year change in the natural log of firm market value. Log of Assets is the natural log of total assets. Asset Growth is the natural log of the growth rate of total assets over the prior year. Additionally, we include age-group indicator variables which are dummies for firms between 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, and 16-20 Table 5 Change in seniors and small firm interaction
Change in Seniors is the year-over-year change in the proportion of seniors in a given county. Small is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is below median market value and is zero otherwise. Controls include the following: Size is the natural log of market value. Earn. Growth Vol. is the standard deviation of operating income growth over the previous five years from year -4 to 0. Net Income, Cash, and Long-Term Debt are scaled by total assets. Q is approximated using the market-to-book ratio. Return is the monthly stock returns over the prior two years. Change in Size is the year over year change in the natural log of firm market value. Log of Assets is the natural log of total assets. Asset Growth is the natural log of the growth rate of total assets over the prior year. Additionally, we include age-group indicator variables which are dummies for firms between 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, and 16-20 Net Income, Cash, and Long-Term Debt are scaled by total assets. Q is approximated using the market-to-book ratio. Return is the monthly stock returns over the prior two years. Change in Size is the year over year change in the natural log of firm market value. Log of Assets is the natural log of total assets. Asset Growth is the natural log of the growth rate of total assets over the prior year. Additionally, we include age-group indicator variables which are dummies for firms between 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, and 16-20 Table 7 Decade change in seniors
Change in Seniors is the decade-over-decade (1990 over 1980 and 2000 over 1990, respectively) change in the proportion of seniors in a given county. Size is the natural log of market value. Earn. Growth Vol. is the standard deviation of operating income growth over the previous five years from year -4 to 0. Net Income, Cash, and LongTerm Debt are scaled by total assets. Q is approximated using the market-to-book ratio. Return is the monthly stock returns over the prior two years. Size is the natural log of firm market value. Log of Assets is the natural log of total assets. Asset Growth is the natural log of the growth rate of total assets over the prior year. Additionally, we include age-group indicator variables which are dummies for firms between 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, and 16-20 Change in Seniors is the year-over-year change in the proportion of seniors in a given county. Profit is net income divided by equity. Asset Growth is the natural log of the growth rate of total assets over the prior year. Market-tobook is market value divided by book value of equity. Percentile is the NYSE size percentile that the firm falls in for a given year. In the spirit of Fama and MacBeth (1973) and following Fama and French (2001) We use all firms for each year from 1980-1999 to estimate logit regressions that explain whether a firm pays dividends. We include the following explanatory variables: Seniors is the proportion of seniors in a given county. Size is the natural log of market value. Earn. Growth Vol. is the standard deviation of operating income growth over the previous five years from year -4 to 0. Net Income, Cash, and Long-Term Debt are scaled by total assets. Q is approximated using the market-to-book ratio. Volatility is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the prior two years. Return is the monthly stock returns over the prior two years. Size is the natural log of firm market value. Log of Assets is the natural log of total assets. Asset Growth is the natural log of the growth rate of total assets over the prior year. Additionally, we include age-group indicator variables which are dummies for firms between 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, and 16-20 Seniors (6) Proportion of citizens in a given county which are age 65 or older, as taken from census data in calendar year t-1 to predict next year's dividends Change in Seniors (7) (Seniors in year t-1) -(Seniors in year t-2) Size (8) Log of the market value of equity at the end of calendar year t-1, calculated as shares outstanding x year-end share price from CRSP Earnings Volatility (9) Standard deviation of operating income (COMPUSTAT OIBDP ) over the previous five years (t-4 through t) Earn. Growth Vol. (10) Standard deviation of the growth rate of operating income (COMPUSTAT item OIBDP) over the previous five year (t-4 through t) Net Income (11) COMPUSTAT item NI in year t-1, scaled by total assets (COMPUSTAT item AT) Cash (12) COMPUSTAT item CHE in year t-1, scaled by total assets (COMPUSTAT item AT) Q (13)
The book value of equity as taken from COMPUSTAT (item CEQ) divided by the market equity (shares outstanding x share price from CRSP) at the end of year t-1
Debt (14) COMPUSTAT item DLTT in year t-1, scaled by total assets (COMPUSTAT item AT) Volatility (15) Standard deviation of monthly stock returns in years t-2 and t-1 as taken from CRSP Return (16) Compound monthly stock return of the past two years return, for years t-2 and t-1 as taken from CRSP. Log of Assets (17) Natural log of total assets (COMPUSTAT item AT) at end of year t-1 Asset Growth (18) Natural log of the growth rate of total assets (COMPUSTAT item AT) from the end of year t-2 to the end of year t-1
Appendix B
Replication of Becker et al. (2011) Seniors is the proportion of seniors in a given county. Net Income, Cash, and Long-Term Debt are scaled by total assets. Q is approximated using the market-to-book ratio. Volatility is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the prior two years. Return is the monthly stock returns over the prior two years. Size is the natural log of firm market value. Log of Assets is the natural log of total assets. Asset Growth is the natural log of the growth rate of total assets over the prior year. Additionally, we include age-group indicator variables which are dummies for firms between 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, and 16-20 
